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Abstract Commercial off-the-shelf microprocessors are
the core of low-cost embedded systems due to their pro-
grammability and cost-effectiveness. Recent advances
in electronic technologies have allowed remarkable im-
provements in their performance. However, they have
also made microprocessors more susceptible to tran-
sient faults induced by radiation. These non-destructive
events (soft errors), may cause a microprocessor to pro-
duce a wrong computation result or lose control of a
system with catastrophic consequences. Therefore, soft
error mitigation has become a compulsory requirement
for an increasing number of applications, which operate
from the space to the ground level. In this context, this
paper uses the concept of selective hardening, which is
aimed to design reduced-overhead and flexible mitiga-
tion techniques. Following this concept, a novel flexible
version of the software-based fault recovery technique
known as SWIFT-R is proposed. Our approach makes
possible to select different registers subsets from the mi-
croprocessor register file to be protected on software.
Thus, design space is enriched with a wide spectrum of
new partially protected versions, which offer more flex-
ibility to designers. This permits to find the best trade-
offs between performance, code size, and fault coverage.
Three case studies have been developed to show the ap-
plicability and flexibility of the proposal.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, major technological advances in the
development of microprocessors have occurred. Some
of these developments include the dramatic increase in
their performance, and the ever increasing integration
density. These were made possible mainly thanks to the
progressive miniaturization of electronic components.
Nevertheless, this fact has also led to some adverse con-
sequences. One of the most concerning is that, due to
the reduction of the electronic components size to nano-
metric scales, voltage source levels and noise margins
have also been reduced, which has caused electronic
devices to become less reliable and, therefore, micro-
processors to be more susceptible to several types of
faults, especially those induced by radiation [1].
Radiation effects on electronic components can cause
catastrophic consequences in mission-critical systems.
Radiation-induced faults are originated by the impact
of high-energy particles against the electronic compo-
nents which may result, directly or indirectly, in the ion-
ization of their internal silicon structures. These events
can affect the components operation permanently (per-
manent faults) or temporary (transient faults). In this
paper, we will focus on the latter. Transient faults do
not result in permanent damage, but may affect the
system behavior by altering temporarily signal trans-
fers or stored values. These are also known as soft er-
rors. Specifically, we will focus on the type of transient
faults known as Single Event Upset (SEU ), which is
characterized by the logic state alteration of a single
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memory element in the system [2]. SEUs have usually
been considered as a concern for space application sys-
tems, because it is in outer space where these are more
frequent. However, in recent decades, this problem has
been extended to the electronic circuits that must op-
erate in the atmosphere [3], and even at ground level
[4].
Moreover, thanks to their programmability, perfor-
mance and cost-effectiveness, Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS ) electronic components offer important capa-
bilities and benefits in the implementation of low-cost
safety-critical and high availability systems, such as mi-
cro-satellites [5,6] or avionics safety systems [7]. Nev-
ertheless, their high sensitivity to radiation-induced ef-
fects, particularly transient faults, limit their applica-
bility in the near future. At this juncture, soft error
mitigation has become a mandatory issue for an in-
creasing number of application domains (avionics, au-
tomotive, defense, medicine, and communications) [1,
8].
To overcome the problems produced by soft errors,
applying fine-grain redundant hardware has been the
usual solution in qualified RadHard microprocessors.
However, COTS components prevent the application of
hardware-based soft error mitigation methods directly
within the processor, therefore other approaches have to
be adopted. Duplication or triplication of COTS com-
ponents are the most usual coarse-grain hardware al-
ternatives for these kind of embedded systems [9]. De-
spite the majority of these hardware-based approaches
provide an effective solution to the transient faults, in
general, these techniques have serious drawbacks to the
system in terms of used resources, power consumption,
die size, design time, and economic costs; limiting their
use in low-cost and small systems.
In recent years, however, several proposals based on
redundant software have been developed, adding both
detection and fault correction capabilities to programs.
As software-based techniques do not require any modifi-
cations in the hardware of the microprocessor, they are
particularly suitable for COTS based systems ensuring
an acceptable dependability level [10–12]. In fact, some
of these approaches have already been used in mission
critical systems, including COTS microprocessors, for
satellites and space missions [7].
Although software-based approaches are more cost-
effective than the hardware-based ones, they provoke
a non-negligible overhead to the programs in terms of
execution time and code size [13]. In many cases, this
is the main difficulty for the software-based techniques
feasibility. In order to reduce these overheads and to
offer more flexibility to designers, recent works have
proposed the selective hardening based on software [14–
16]. This consists of protecting only specific parts of the
program or the microprocessor architectural resources
(reachable from the instruction set architecture - ISA)
by means of redundant software. Protected parts can be
chosen according to their vulnerability or their contri-
bution to the overheads. In the first case, to prioritize
the protection of the most vulnerable resources, and
in the second case, to avoid causing a high impact to
the system, such as a high overhead in memory or an
unacceptable degradation of performance.
Based on this concept, we present a novel selec-
tive version of the software-based technique known as
SWIFT-R [17], namely selective SWIFT-R (S-SWIFT-
R). Our proposal allows applying the protection to dif-
ferent register subsets from the microprocessor register
file looking for a reduction in the overheads but keeping
a high fault coverage. The feasibility of the proposal is
demonstrated by means of experimental results in three
representative case studies.
As a result, this technique is suitable for low-cost
dependable applications which use COTS microproces-
sors. Furthermore, the flexibility of our approach al-
lows the designer applying the technique in an incre-
mental way to explore the solutions space on the soft-
ware side effectively. This not only facilitates to find
a software version that best satisfies the dependability
requirements, but also avoids the excessive overheads
caused by usual software-based techniques.
The main contributions of this work can be sum-
marized as follows. Firstly, it is proposed S-SWIFT-
R: a new selective fault recovery software-based tech-
nique based on the well known SWIFT-R. The pre-
sented approach leverages the idea of selective harden-
ing to enrich the (software-side) design space with a
wide spectrum of new possibilities. The main improve-
ment over SWIFT-R is determined by the increase of
flexibility and the possibility to explore different so-
lutions offering the best reliability/overhead compro-
mise. This is a mandatory task for the low-cost depend-
able design of COTS -based applications. Secondly, it is
presented a comprehensive set of experimental results
which demonstrate the flexibility and applicability of
S-SWIFT-R by representing several trade-offs between
overheads and fault coverage.
This paper is organized as follows. Next section pro-
vides background information about the related work.
Section 3 presents the proposed soft error mitigation
technique: S-SWIFT-R. Section 4 reports and discusses
the experimental results obtained in the proposal eval-
uation. Finally, Section 5 summarizes some concluding
remarks and suggests the future works.
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2 Related work
Hardware redundancy has traditionally been the most
common approach to address reliability issues in the
design of digital circuits. This includes a wide variety
of solutions based on: Error Detection and Correction
Codes — EDACs [18], gate-level logic redundancy [19,
20], and architectural level protection [21]. More recent
techniques propose selective hardening of the system,
adding protection only to the most vulnerable hardware
parts [22]; or reducing the performance degradation by
applying partial redundant threading [23,24].
In recent decades, thanks to the current prolifera-
tion of processor based systems and the need for de-
pendable low-cost solutions, a large number of protec-
tion approaches based on the use of redundant software
have emerged. The so-called Software Implemented Hard-
ware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT ) [25] techniques can be
divided in two main categories according to the type of
error they pretend to detect/correct: errors that may af-
fect the control flow execution [26]; or errors that may
affect the program data [27].
The first group is also known as signature checking
techniques. Some examples of these include Control-
Flow Checking by Software Signatures (CFCSS ) [26],
Assertions for Control Flow Checking (ACFC ) [28],
Yet Another Control flow Checking Approach (YACCA)
[29], and Control-flow Error Detection through Asser-
tions (CEDA) [30]. Moreover, those approaches included
in the second group are mainly based on the N-versions
programming approach [31], which can be applied at
different granularity levels: program [11,32], procedure
[33], and the most commonly used, instruction level [27,
34–36].
Most software-based approaches are aimed at de-
tecting faults. Some of them apply redundancy to high-
level source code (e.g., C language) by means of au-
tomatic transformation rules [37], whereas others use
instruction redundancy at a low level (assembly code)
in order to reduce the code overhead and performance
degradation, and improve detection rates [26,27,36].
Only a few of these techniques have been extended to
allow system recovery, but they incur, as a consequence,
in higher overheads in terms of code size and execution
time [17,38]. Overall, even though software-based tech-
niques can be a suitable protection solution for low-cost
COTS -based applications, they also could pose a design
problem such as high overhead in memory, and dispro-
portionate penalties in performance. This is especially
true for those techniques that are addressed not only to
fault detection but recovery tasks.
To reduce the implicit overheads of software-based
techniques, a few works based on selective hardening on
software have been proposed recently. They propose to
transfer to the software world the concept of selective
hardening, typical from the hardware world [22,39,40].
In [15,16], the authors propose the selective instruction
replication to guarantee the application-level correct-
ness in multimedia applications. This kind of applica-
tions can tolerate, in some cases, a execution which is
not 100% numerically correct, and the program results
can still appear to be correct from the user perspective
[41]. In our case, mission-critical systems require the
architecture-level correctness instead. In addition, the
work presented in [14] uses the selective hardening on
software focused on the detection of data-flow errors.
Our proposal allows the system recovery as well.
The main advantage offered by selective software-
based techniques is the flexibility. Designers are pro-
vided with a wide set of possibilities, being able to
explore deeply the design space provided by the soft-
ware techniques, taking into account factors such as
code overhead, performance degradation, and reliability
level. For instance, if applying a particular set of hard-
ening routines results inconvenient according to the re-
quirements of an application (e.g., if the maximum ex-
ecution time is exceeded), the technique can be applied
partially depending on the critical program resources
or sections. In short, the designer is able to fine-tune a
tailored fault mitigation strategy based on software.
Moreover, recent hybrid hardware/software fault mit-
igation approaches have shown promising results. These
techniques combine software redundancy with additional
hardware support [42–46]. In this context, the S-SWIFT-
R technique here proposed can be used as a part of
a more complex hybrid technique, or as a component
of a cross-layer protection strategy. In fact, our previ-
ous works [47,48] present some preliminary results of
this, when tailored hybrid approaches are used by com-
bining partial protection on both hardware and soft-
ware (co-hardening). Unlike our previous approaches
that were aimed at the hardware/software co-design,
the presented proposal in this work focuses on the pre-
sentation of a new selective software-only fault recov-
ery technique suitable for low-cost COTS -based appli-
cations. In addition, a comprehensive experimentation
is presented to support the proposal.
3 Selective SWIFT-R
Since memories are designed to reach the highest pos-
sible density, they are more sensitive to ionizing par-
ticles than other parts of the circuit. In addition, con-
sidering that they represent the largest parts of mod-
ern designs, memories are the first candidates to be
hardened in a design. However, there already is a large
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number of fault tolerance techniques, mainly based on
EDACs, that may solve this problem properly [18]. In
this work, therefore, we address the protection of the
microprocessor register file due to both its criticality in
microprocessor-based applications and the difficulties
to protect it.
To do so, we focus on this issue by means of the
technique proposed by Reis et al. known as SWIFT-
R [17]. It is a software-only recovery technique based
on low-level instruction transformation rules (assembly
code), which is based on the well known Triple Modu-
lar Redundancy (TMR). SWIFT-R stands for SoftWare
Implemented Fault Tolerance - Recovery. It intertwines
three copies of the program and adds majority voting
before critical instructions. In other words, it consists
of the triplication of data and instructions, jointly with
the insertion of verification points to check data consis-
tency (by means of majority voters).
Fig. 1 presents an example of a basic program hard-
ened using SWIFT-R (assembly code). Notice that reg-
ister copies (s0’, s0’’, . . . ) are stored in other available
registers from the microprocessor register file, i.e., un-
used registers in the program. Furthermore, majority
voters are recovery procedures that compare if at least
two versions of a register have the same value, correct-
ing the third copy (possibly corrupted).
# Non-hardened code SWIFT-R code
1 main: LOAD s0, 00 main: LOAD s0, 00
2 Create s0 copies
3 LOAD s1, 2A LOAD s1, 2A
4 Create s1 copies
5 ADD s0, s1 ADD s0, s1
6 ADD s0’, s1’
7 ADD s0’’, s1’’
8 CALL incr CALL incr
9 Majority voter for s0
10 STORE s0, 00 STORE s0, 00
11 RETURN RETURN
12
13 incr: LOAD s2, 0F incr: LOAD s2, 0F
14 Create s2 copies
15 ADD s0, s2 ADD s0, s2
16 ADD s0’, s2’
17 ADD s0’’, s2’’
18 RETURN RETURN
Fig. 1 Example hardened program using SWIFT-R
When applying software techniques, it is manda-
tory to take into account their needs in terms of mi-
croprocessor resources. This consideration may hinder
the feasibility of the hardening in case the technique it-
self demands a lot of resources or if the microprocessor
is very limited. Features that have to be considered in-
clude the number of available registers in the micropro-
cessor register file to create redundant copies, and the
amount of available space in the program memory for
instructions replication. In case of SWIFT-R, two ad-
ditional copies are required for each protected register.
This is, a total of 2n additional registers are necessary
to fully implement SWIFT-R (where n is the number of
used registers in the non-hardened program). This fact
makes that SWIFT-R may not result suitable in many
cases for reduced-cost solutions. Furthermore, due to
its fault recovery capabilities, SWIFT-R produces high
overheads that, regarding the application, can easily
surpass 3× the original code size and execution time.
To alleviate this problem, the original authors proposed
to apply SWIFT-R to superscalar processors, in which
the instruction level parallelism (ILP) can be exploited
to execute redundant instructions and, in this way, the
impact on performance can be diminished. Neverthe-
less, in case of low-cost solutions, where microprocessors
usually have more resource limitations, another solution
is required.
Thus, we propose several improvements to the orig-
inal technique based on selective hardening in order to
increase its flexibility and make it suitable for reduced-
cost embedded systems. S-SWIFT-R is also applied by
means of low-level instruction transformation rules but,
in our approach, the strategy consists of applying soft-
ware protection mechanisms only to some selectively
chosen registers from the microprocessor register file.
That is, it is possible to select several register subsets
to be protected from all the registers, e.g., hardening
only the most critical registers.
Taking advantage of the selectiveness on the ap-
plication of S-SWIFT-R, designers can obtain differ-
ent hardened versions of the same program exploring
the design space in a fine-grained manner. The options
were exactly two in the past: whether to use the non-
hardened program or to use the hardened one; however,
now there are many new possibilities between these two
extremes, whose overheads are reduced but still may of-
fer a high fault coverage. The number of versions (m)
is equal to the number of possible combinations (with-
out repetition) among the program used registers, i.e.,
m = 2n, where, n represents the total number of used
registers in the program (m includes the non-hardened
version as well). Therefore, using S-SWIFT-R, design
space is enriched with several new solutions, which of-
fer more flexibility to designers, and facilitate to find
the best trade-offs among reliability, performance, and
code size.
In addition, this approach is useful as well in cases
when is not possible to apply SWIFT-R completely.
This can occur due to the limitations of the micropro-
cessor (e.g., small number of registers available in the
register file, reduced space in the program memory, . . . )
or the high demand for resource utilization in the pro-
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gram (e.g., if the non-hardened code uses most registers
available in the register file and, therefore, there are not
enough available registers for the necessary redundant
copies). In these cases, it is possible to prioritize the
registers depending of their impact of overheads and/or
reliability and protect only a subset of them.
To implement this novel approach successfully, we
propose to use the concept of Sphere of Replication
(SoR) in a flexible way. SoR was first proposed in [49].
The SoR defines the logic domain of redundant exe-
cution. This means that the architectural resources lo-
cated within the SoR are considered to have redundant
mechanisms; consequently, they are protected against
faults. Hence, the SoR delimits the protection cover-
age of hardening techniques. Moving the borders of the
SoR, it is possible to modify the protection level of dif-
ferent fault tolerance techniques by including or exclud-
ing various components inside the sphere.
One can include/exclude the memory subsystem,
the microprocessor register file, or even select only a
subset of critical registers from the microprocessor reg-
ister file. For instance, in EDDI [27] the memory sub-
system is considered to be located inside the SoR, so
the instructions responsible to perform read/write op-
erations over the memory do not cause that any data
cross the SoR borders. In the same way, if the memory
subsystem is considered to be outside of the SoR (as
in SWIFT [36]), those instructions reading from mem-
ory or writing into memory are causing some data to
cross through the sphere frontiers and must be handled
in a special way. In our case, S-SWIFT-R allows to
include/exclude selectively chosen subsets of registers
form the register file.
To facilitate the proposal implementation we pro-
pose that the program instructions, whose execution
imply a data flow crossing the borders of the SoR, have
to be classified in a special way. In case only the micro-
processor register file is located inside the SoR, when
an instruction causes that some data enter inside the
SoR (e.g., reading an input port, loading a value into
a register or reading a value from memory), it is classi-
fied as inSoR. In contrast, when an instruction provokes
data to go out from the SoR (e.g., writing on an output
port, storing a value into the memory), it is classified
as outSoR. Otherwise, instructions whose execution do
not imply a data flow (e.g., an unconditional branch)
are classified as none.
In the original SWIFT-R, the SoR is considered to
hold the complete microprocessor register file. Thus, in
Fig. 1, instructions 1, 3, and 13 are classified as inSoR
and are followed by data replication instructions on the
hardened code (lines: 2, 4, and 14). Instructions 5, 8,
11, 15, and 18 are classified as none. Instructions 5,
and 15 perform an arithmetic operation, thus, they are
replicated after the original instruction using the reg-
ister copies (lines: 6, 7, 16, and 17). Finally, the only
instruction that sends data outside of the SoR is the
instruction number 10 (it sends data to the memory
subsystem), and therefore, data should be verified be-
fore leaving the sphere by means of a majority voter
(line number 9).
The application of S-SWIFT-R to a source code (as-
sembly code) can be explained as follows:
1. Each program instruction is classified according to
the direction of the data flow it provokes with regard
to the SoR, whose elements should be previously de-
fined. The architectural resources located within the
SoR are considered to be protected against faults.
Instructions are classified as:
(a) inSoR: those instructions whose execution pro-
vokes a data flow entering to the SoR.
(b) outSoR: those instructions whose functionality
causes a data flow leaving the SoR.
(c) none: those instructions whose execution do not
imply a data flow (e.g., an unconditional branch)
or those that provoke a data flow that does not
cross the SoR borders.
2. Data triplication the first time that any data enter
to the SoR. Therefore, for each instruction classified
as inSoR, two additional copies will be created of the
data entering to the sphere. These redundant copies
have to be created by copying the register values,
without repeating memory or input port accesses.
3. Triplication of instructions that perform any data
operation (e.g., arithmetic, logic, shift, rotation in-
structions). Notice that redundant instructions should
operate using register copies (replicated data).
4. Verify the correctness of the data involved in the
instructions classified as outSoR before their execu-
tion. This verification is made by inserting majority
voters and recovery procedures just before these in-
structions. This is necessary to avoid erroneous data
leaving the sphere, because once the data have left
the SoR, recovery will be not possible, and the cor-
rupted data may cause a system error.
5. Special consideration should be given to instruc-
tions located before a conditional branch which alter
the ALU flags (zero, carry, . . . ). Data involved in
these instructions have to be checked as well (using
again majority voters and recovery procedures be-
fore their execution). This verification is necessary
because if a register value is corrupted, an operation
using this register may produce an erroneous resul-
tant flag, and consequently, this may provoke an in-
correct branch somewhere in the program’s control
flow graph after the conditional branch execution.
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6. Release redundant registers (copies) if they are not
needed anymore in the rest of the program; other-
wise, copies should be kept along the program exe-
cution. This condition implies a detailed analysis to
the control flow graph.
This selective approach of SWIFT-R is made possi-
ble by the flexible implementation of the sphere of repli-
cation. Basically, the new proposal consists in moving
out of the SoR the registers that are not required to
be protected, while some other registers remain within
the SoR and, consequently, code transformations are
responsible for protecting only this subset of registers.
Observe that program instructions should be re-
classified when elements within the SoR change (when
some registers are considered within the SoR and others
outside of it). Each instruction is classified according to
the direction of the data flow it causes with regard to
the new SoR components. Thus, instructions involving
data stored in unprotected registers may cause some
data to cross through the SoR frontiers. The data flow
between two registers (in an instruction considered be-
fore as none because the data flow occurred inside the
sphere) could have changed, in case one of the regis-
ters had been removed from the the SoR. Depending
on the new data flow direction that instruction should
be classified as inSoR or outSoR. For instance, in the
instruction ADD s0, s1, where the s0 register is con-
sidered to be located within the sphere, and the s1 reg-
ister is considered outside of it, while reading the data
stored in the register s1 to sum it to the data stored in
s0, a data flow is produced from outside the sphere to
the inside of it; therefore, the instruction ADD should be
classified as inSoR. Similarly, in the case that s0 was
considered outside the sphere and s1 inside of it, the
produced data flow (when reading the value stored in
s1 to sum it to the data stored in s0) would be from
inside of the sphere to outside of it and, thus, the ADD
instruction should be classified as outSoR.
In order to illustrate the approach, Fig. 2 and Fig.
3 show an example with several versions of a basic pro-
gram hardened using S-SWIFT-R in several register
subsets. Notice that the fully hardened version obtained
by S-SWIFT-R, i.e., the version with protection in all
the program used registers (’s0 and s1 protected’ ver-
sion in Fig. 3), is the same than the one obtained by
the original SWIFT-R approach.
Consideration should be given to the fact that if a
fault affects data enclosed in the SoR, and then the cor-
rupted data leave the SoR (as a result of the execution
of an outSoR instruction), it may provoke an unrecov-
erable error because there will be no additional mech-
anisms outside of the SoR to detect the inconsistency.
# Non-hardened Protected register: s0
1 LOAD s0, 00 LOAD s0, 00
2 Create s0 copies
3 LOAD s1, 2A LOAD s1, 2A
4
5
6 ADD s0, s1 ADD s0, s1
7 ADD s0’, s1
8 ADD s0’’, s1
9 Majority voter for s0
10
11 STORE s0, (s1) STORE s0, (s1)
Fig. 2 Example hardened program using S-SWIFT-R (’non-
hardened’ and ’register s0 protected’ versions)
# Protected register: s1 Protected registers: s0,s1
1 LOAD s0, 00 LOAD s0, 00
2 Create s0 copies
3 LOAD s1, 2A LOAD s1, 2A
4 Create s1 copies Create s1 copies
5 Majority voter for s1
6 ADD s0, s1 ADD s0, s1
7 ADD s0’, s1’
8 ADD s0’’, s1’’
9 Majority voter for s0
10 Majority voter for s1 Majority voter for s1
11 STORE s0, (s1) STORE s0, (s1)
Fig. 3 Example hardened program using S-SWIFT-R (’reg-
ister s1 protected’ and ’registers s0 and s1 protected’ ver-
sions)
Hence, it is necessary to verify the data correctness be-
fore leaving the sphere.
A particular case of this can be seen in Fig. 3 (’reg-
ister s1 protected’ version) when a majority voter is
inserted before the instruction ADD s0, s1 (line 6). In
this example, only the s1 register is considered within
the SoR. Therefore, when executing the instruction in
line 6 (whose function is to do s0 = s0 + s1), there will
be a data flow from s1 to s0, or in other words, there
will be a data flow from inside the SoR going outward;
thus, a majority voter should be inserted to verify the
correctness of the value stored in s1, before it leaves
the sphere.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that triplication of
instructions imply the protection not only of the reg-
isters but also of all datapaths where instructions pass
through. Replicas of instructions will pass all pipeline
paths so they are all protected through not only spec-
ified register subset but all other components in the
execution pipeline.
4 Evaluation
In order to evaluate the proposed technique, firstly, it
was implemented using the API (Application Program-
ming Interface) exposed by the Software Hardening En-
vironment (SHE ) (proposed in [47]). Secondly, the fault
coverage of the approach was assessed using an FPGA
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emulation-based fault injection tool called FTUnshades
[50].
The experimental setup is described in the first part
of this section. Afterwards, analysis with respect to the
usage of registers in the non-hardened versions is dis-
cussed. Next, overhead results caused by the application
of S-SWIFT-R are presented in the third part. Fault
coverage results are remarked in the fourth part. Fi-
nally, the last part of this section presents experimental
results for an incremental hardening strategy based on
S-SWIFT-R.
4.1 Experimental setup
S-SWIFT-R has been implemented using the Software
Hardening Environment (SHE ). This a tool aimed to
implement, automatically apply, and preliminarily eval-
uate software-based fault tolerance techniques. It com-
prises a flexible hardening multi-target compiler (source-
to-source) and an instruction set simulator to assist the
design decisions.
The hardened code generated by SHE was targeted
to the PicoBlaze microprocessor [51]. PicoBlaze is a
widely used IP (intellectual property core) with similar
features to common 8-bit COTS microprocessors, and
since it is a soft-core, it can be used within FPGA-based
fault emulation tools in order to exhaustively assess the
fault coverage in real conditions. Moreover, PicoBlaze
has severe limitations in performance and resources.
These facts make PicoBlaze particularly appropriate for
this work. Firstly, software-based techniques cannot al-
ways be completely applied to the programs running in
this microprocessor because of both their high code and
performance overheads, and the microprocessor limita-
tions; therefore, selective hardening on software may
result more suitable in these cases. Secondly, it is nec-
essary to inject a large number of faults to the system
to obtain statistically representative reliability results,
which can be carried out using a FPGA-based fault em-
ulation tool.
The main features of the microprocessor are: 16
byte-wide general-purpose data registers (numbered from
0 to F in hexadecimal notation), 1K instructions (10
bits) of programmable on-chip program store, byte-wide
Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) with CARRY and ZERO
indicator flags, 64-byte internal scratchpad RAM, 256
input and 256 output ports, 31-location CALL/RETURN
stack, and KCPSM3 assembly syntax.
The benchmark software suite used in the experi-
ments is made up of three representative programs used
in embedded systems: proportional-integral-derivative
controller (PID), finite impulse response filter (FIR),
and advanced encryption standard (AES ). A more com-
plex benchmark (such as MiBench [52] or MediaBench
[53]) could not be evaluated due to the mentioned re-
source limitations in PicoBlaze.
The test programs, for demonstration purposes, were
rewritten using only 5 from 16 available registers in the
microprocessor register file, so enough resources remain
free to harden all registers. This first code transforma-
tion was performed manually. Then, the three programs
were automatically hardened with S-SWIFT-R using
SHE. Since each one of them used 5 registers, a total of
32 different software versions were considered for each
program (including the non-hardened version and all
the selectively hardened possibilities). This means that
a total of 96 different program versions were evaluated.
This brute force strategy is followed only for demon-
stration purposes to show the flexibility of S-SWIFT-
R. However, as can be seen in the next section (Tables
1 and 2), the designer has enough information to pre-
select only a subset with some of the best candidates
for further analyses (especially the reliability evalua-
tion, which is the most time-consuming task).
We performed fault-injection experiments to evalu-
ate the technique fault coverage. FTUnshades was used
for this purpose. This is an FPGA-based fault emula-
tion tool that permits to assess several dependability
parameters on the real system implementation. Unlike
other emulation or simulation tools, FTUnshades al-
lows the fault injection without modifications in the
original code, and without hardware instrumentation.
This tool is composed of an FPGA emulation board and
a suite of software tools for testing the emulated design
and analyzing test results.
4.2 Registers usage analysis for the non-hardened
software version
Table 1 shows the registers usage report for the test
programs, which is provided automatically by SHE. It
presents information about the accesses to each regis-
ter during the program execution, and their lifetime.
Accesses give information about the registers usage for
write, read, and read/write operations. These values
are expressed as the percentage of the total number
of each operation type. Moreover, the register lifetime
represents the time when necessary data for the correct
program execution are present in the register [54]. Any
fault occurring to the register during that time destroys
data integrity. Lifetime is expressed as the percentage
of the total program time.
Register lifetime is expressed as the sum of clock
cycles of all the register living intervals during the pro-
gram simulation. A living interval starts with a generic
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write operation and ends with the last read operation
which precedes the next write operation or the end of
the program execution.
This information is an useful guide for the designer
to pre-select which registers should be hardened and,
in this manner, avoid to explore all the possible com-
binations in the design space. Number of accesses to
each register is related to how the overheads will be af-
fected in terms of code size and execution time, whereas
lifetime is related to reliability.
Table 1 Registers usage report (non-hardened programs)
Test Reg Write[%] Read[%] Read/Write[%] Lifetime[%]
0 23.93 47.19 0.00 63.70
1 17.09 5.55 18.96 66.38
PID 2 13.67 11.10 35.88 81.67
3 13.67 11.10 23.48 81.67
4 31.63 25.05 21.68 74.99
0 39.28 44.85 0.00 34.81
1 24.99 10.34 28.96 75.16
FIR 2 17.86 20.68 38.47 88.27
3 17.86 20.67 31.67 88.27
4 0.01 3.46 0.90 99.99
0 48.57 25.19 50.82 80.57
1 8.22 35.36 29.59 92.34
AES 2 9.78 19.39 10.80 62.49
3 22.39 12.85 7.00 34.81
4 11.04 7.21 1.78 35.56
When S-SWIFT-R is applied to some highly ac-
cessed registers, such as 4 in the PID program or 0
in the AES program, the overheads are expected to in-
crease considerably because this protection implies to
use a higher number of redundant instructions. Nonethe-
less, protecting these registers does not guarantee im-
proved reliability, since the vulnerability of each regis-
ter depends, in part, on its lifetime during the program
execution, and this is not always correlated with the
number of times that the register is accessed.
Lifetime has a high impact on reliability, since the
higher the lifetime is, the longer the register is prone to
soft errors. However, it should be considered as well that
the vulnerability of each register depends not only of its
lifetime but also of the criticality of the functions that
the register is used for within the program source code.
Therefore, more investigation is required as additional
criticality criteria have to be taken into account in order
to accurately select and prioritize the best candidates
to be hardened.
For the scope of this work, however, we will focus
only on the lifetime using a slight adjustment as it is
important considering how the living intervals are dis-
tributed along the timeline. In cases of registers having
the same/similar lifetime, criticality is lower for those
presenting a larger number of living intervals. Since a
new living interval is created every time there is a write
operation to the register, during the write operation
there is a fraction of the time in which the register has
not yet taken the correct value, and any fault affecting
it during that time will be overwritten when it finally
takes the written value. According to this, we propose
to adjust the lifetime by subtracting the number of
write operations from the total lifetime of a register.
Finally, the adjusted lifetime is then normalized with
respect to the duration of the program.
The proposed strategy to prioritize the registers to
be hardened is to establish a ranking of the most criti-
cal registers according to their normalized adjusted life-
time. Ranks are assigned to these values in descending
order, which means that registers on top of the ranking
will also be the most critical ones. Then, registers will
be selected for hardening in the same order as its posi-
tion in the rank indicates. Table 2 presents the results
for the studied cases.
Table 2 Prioritization and selection of registers to be hard-
ened
Test Register Adjusted lifetime[%] Criticality rank
0 62.49 5
1 65.52 4
PID 2 80.98 1− 2
3 80.98 1− 2
4 73.40 3
0 32.91 5
1 73.95 4
FIR 2 87.41 2− 3
3 87.41 2− 3
4 99, 99 1
0 74.29 2
1 91.27 1
AES 2 61.23 3
3 31.92 5
4 34.13 4
Notice that if we had considered the lifetime (in-
stead of the adjusted lifetime) to establish the critical-
ity rankings, the rank order would have been the same.
Nevertheless, this is not a general rule; there might be
different cases in which the rank order may be altered.
Results showed in Table 2 indicate the order in which
registers have to be selected for hardening. For instance,
in the AES case the first register to be protected is the
register number 1, followed by the register 0, then the
number 2, and so on, according to the criticality rank-
ing.
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 (as mentioned before), we
will evaluate not only a few hardened program ver-
sions, but all the versions offered by S-SWIFT-R to
demonstrate the flexibility of the proposed technique.
However, in order to show the usefulness of the pro-
posed pre-selection strategy, Section 4.5 presents the
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case when an incremental hardening approach is fol-
lowed based on the criticality rankings.
4.3 Overheads
Fig. 4 presents the overhead results for all the software
versions hardened selectively. Static code size overhead
and execution time overhead are showed for all the pos-
sibilities of our test programs (PID, FIR, and AES ).
These results are normalized with a baseline built with
the non-hardened version of each program.
A hardened software version obtained by applying
S-SWIFT-R only to the register subset {0-2-4} means
that only these registers are protected (from 16 possi-
ble general-purpose PicoBlaze registers). Hereafter, the
names of the hardened versions correspond to the reg-
ister group that is protected.
When highly accessed registers are protected, the
overheads increase considerably (as expected). This can
be observed clearly in the registers 0 and 1 of the AES
program, which cause a high overhead when protected.
For example, in the {0} version, the code size and execu-
tion time overheads are 2.54× and 2.61×, respectively.
Notice that overheads results increase incrementally
when more registers are protected. In case of the PID,
static code size overhead goes from 1.28× (in the {2}
version) up to 2.65× in the fully protected version (i.e.,
the {0,1,2,3,4} version), whereas execution time over-
head ranges between 1.20× (in the {0} version) and
2.75× (in the SWIFT-R version). Moreover, in the FIR
case, code overhead varies from 1.01× (in the {4} ver-
sion) to 2.67× in the fully protected version, and ex-
ecution time overhead ranges from 1.01× (in the {4}
version) to 2.53× (in the SWIFT-R version). Finally, in
the AES case, code size overhead goes from 1.22× (in
the {4} version) up to 3.30× (in the SWIFT-R version),
whereas execution time overhead varies from 1.44× (in
the {4} version) to 3.72× (in the SWIFT-R version).
The above mentioned fact means that, as expected,
more resources (code lines and execution time) are re-
quired when more protection is implemented (more reg-
isters are protected). However, it is very important to
notice two additional issues as well, which are related
to the contribution to the overheads that each register
makes when it is protected. Firstly, each register makes
its contribution to code overhead and execution time
overhead independently. For instance, the {4} version
in the PID case presents a considerable code overhead
(1.89×) while its execution time overhead is lower than
that (1.48×). Secondly, each register makes its contri-
bution to overheads in very different manners. There
are versions in which the protection of some registers
causes an almost negligible impact, such as in the {4}
version of the FIR case (the code size and execution
time overheads are both 1.01×), whereas at the same
time, there are other versions in which the protection of
only one register can provoke a high impact, like in the
{2} version of the same test program (code overhead
1.61× and execution time overhead 1.56×).
In addition, in the case of AES, it is worth noting
that due to the high overheads, it was necessary to ar-
tificially expand the microprocessor address space. In
this way, it was possible to use an additional memory
block to fit some of the hardened versions within the
program memory properly.
Consideration should be given to the several inter-
mediate protected versions that might result suitable
for many applications domains. Although the version
with the maximum expected fault coverage is the one
with protection in all its registers (SWIFT-R version),
there are many other versions with protection in groups
of four, three, two, or one registers, whose overheads
are lower than those caused by the complete protec-
tion and can offer enough fault coverage depending on
the application requirements. These versions should be
considered within the analysis as well.
4.4 Fault coverage
In the following tests, we focus on the type of soft error
known as Single Event Upset (SEU ). This is a radiation
effect that is caused by the direct or indirect ionization
provoked by the impact of an incident energetic particle
against an electronic component. This effect provokes
a change in the logic state of a single memory element
(memory cell, flip-flop, latch). We will use the bit-flip
fault model to represent this fault. In this model, only
one bit-flip of a storage element occurs throughout the
circuit operation. Since this fault model closely matches
the real fault behavior, it is widely used by the fault
tolerance community to model real faults [37].
In order to evaluate the fault coverage provided by
S-SWIFT-R, a fault injection campaign was carried out
for each system version using FTUnshades (using the
real implementation of the different systems). Injected
faults were classified according to their effect on the
expected system behavior, similarly as it was first pro-
posed by Mukherjee et al. [55]:
1. In case the system completes its execution, and ob-
tains the expected output after that a fault is in-
jected, the memory element (bit) affected by the
fault and, consequently the fault itself, are classi-
fied as unnecessary for Architecturally Correct Exe-
cution - unACE.
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2. If the fault has not been detected/corrected and pro-
vokes the program to complete its execution with
an erroneous output, this fault is called Silent Data
Corruption - SDC.
3. When the fault causes an abnormal program ter-
mination or an infinite execution loop, the fault is
categorized as a Hang.
Note that SDC and Hang are both undesirable ef-
fects (categorized together as ACE faults).
Firstly, an initial experiment was carried out to cal-
ibrate the FTUnshades. This experiment consisted of
an incremental fault injection campaign (increasing the
number of injected faults on each iteration), performed
until statistically representative results were obtained.
Notice that the minimum number of representative in-
jected faults depends on each application complexity
jointly with the microprocessor architecture. The fault
injection campaigns have been performed against the
register file of the microprocessor. The non-hardened
programs were chosen for the tests because they rep-
resent the worst case scenarios. Obtained results show
that the 95% confidence interval is less than ±1.0% af-
ter 80000 fault injection tests. According to the bit-flip
fault model, only one fault was emulated during each
program execution.
Secondly, for each program version, the fault injec-
tion campaign consisted of injecting 80000 faults (SEUs),
emulating only one single fault per program execution.
Each fault was emulated by means of a single bit-flip in
a randomly selected bit from the microprocessor regis-
ter file (16-byte-wide registers) in a randomly selected
clock cycle from all the workload duration.
Fig. 5 shows the fault classification percentages ob-
tained for each system after all the fault injection ex-
periments in the FTUnshades.
It is worth noting that the high fault coverage re-
sults (greater than 75% unACE in all cases) obtained
for the non-hardened versions are due to the fact that
the fault injection test was performed over the complete
register file, even though the programs do not use all the
sixteen available general-purpose registers. Therefore, a
fault injected in an unused register bit is considered as
unACE because it does not affect the expected pro-
gram output. This way of testing has been carried out
by others researchers as well [26,27,36,17,37], which al-
lows to obtain homogeneous result sets comparable to
each other.
One can observe the remarkable increase in the fault
coverage that it is obtained using S-SWIFT-R. In case
of the first test program, the PID, the fault coverage
ranges between 76.06% unACE faults (non-hardened
program) to 98.12% unACE faults (SWIFT-R version).
Moreover, in the second case, for the FIR program, it
goes from 79.19% unACE to 99.26% unACE faults. In
the AES case, the values vary from 81.74% unACE to
98.77% unACE faults. These results represent the per-
centages of injected faults that do not provoke any un-
desirable behavior to the circuit operation.
In addition, there are several intermediate-protected
versions that might be suitable for many applications
depending on the requirements, especially for low-cost
solutions. For example, in the PID program, when pro-
tection is applied only to the registers number 0, 2, and
4 ({0,2,4} version), a considerable fault coverage in-
crease is produced (up to 96.67% unACE faults). An-
other example can be observed for the FIR program
when the protection is applied to the registers 2 and
4 ({2,4} version). In this case, the increase is up to
94.01% unACE faults, which is remarkable, taking into
account that only two registers are being hardened. A
similar example can be noticed from the AES, when
fault coverage in the {0,1,2} version is up to 97.87%
unACE faults.
In the same manner that each register impacts the
overheads independently when it is protected, each reg-
ister contributes apart to the fault coverage improve-
ments. This can be seen, for instance in the PID pro-
gram, in which the fault coverage is 89.67% unACE
when only the register 2 is protected, whereas protect-
ing only the register 3, the percentage is down to 85.76%
unACE (a 3.91% difference).
In many cases, the selective protected versions can
be better candidates for systems where not only the
fault coverage is important, but also the time execution.
Protecting all registers, using a software technique, could
result in the best fault coverage, but at the same time, it
provokes the highest performance degradation. Hence,
overheads and fault coverage results have to be stud-
ied jointly, representing several trade-offs among code
size, performance, and fault coverage. This analysis fa-
cilitates to guide the design decisions to find the solu-
tions having the best reliability/overhead compromise.
For example, the {1,2,4} FIR version is an interest-
ing choice, because it offers both, high fault coverage
(95.66% unACE faults), and acceptable code size and
execution time overheads (1.97× and 2.07×, respec-
tively). In addition, a similar example can be observed
in the {1,4} version of the AES case, when fault cov-
erage of 95.49% unACE faults is reached, whereas the
code and time overheads are 1.73× and 2.29×, respec-
tively. It is worth noting that our technique provides
detection and recovery of faults, therefore, acceptable
trade-offs can be easily reached between overheads and
fault coverage.
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4.5 Incremental hardening strategy
As previously discussed in 4.2, designers can make the
selection and prioritization of registers to be hardened
according to their criticality. This approach facilitates
the design and assessment of a software-based incre-
mental protection strategy, avoiding a brute force strat-
egy since it is a very time-consuming task.
Using the criticality rankings presented in Table 2,
it is proposed to make an a priori selection based on
the criticality rank of each register, which determines
the order in which the register is hardened in an incre-
mental protection approach. This is a straightforward
strategy that allows evaluating only the most effective
software versions in terms of fault coverage.
Fig. 6, on the one hand, illustrates the fault classi-
fication percentages only for the software versions indi-
cated by the criticality rankings. On the other hand, it
also presents, in a secondary axis, their code size and
execution time overheads normalized to a baseline built
with the non-hardened versions. This figure permits to
see at a glance, the representation of several trade-offs
between fault coverage and overheads for the each test
program.
This approach constitutes a remarkable reduction
in the design space, which not only facilitates to reach
the best compromise between reliability and overheads,
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Fig. 6 Fault classification percentages and overheads for the
incremental hardening of the test programs: (a) PID, (b) FIR,
(c) AES
but also to assess effectively only the most interesting
selective hardened versions.
5 Conclusions and future works
The selective hardening based on software permits to
enrich the software-side design space for the soft errors
mitigation techniques. In this way, reliability engineers
have more flexibility to find solutions having the best
reliability/overhead compromise.
In this paper, a selective version of the software-
based technique known as SWIFT-R has been presented
and called S-SWIFT-R. It is possible to select different
registers subsets to be protected from the micropro-
cessor register file. Thanks to its flexibility, this tech-
nique is appropriated for low-cost dependable applica-
tions which use COTS microprocessors. Furthermore,
it can be used for hardware/software hybrid mitigation
approaches as well.
The S-SWIFT-R evaluation results prove that not
only this technique facilitates to find the best trade-offs
among code size, reliability, and performance, but also
can be automated to be applied automatically to the
programs.
Taking into account parameters like the number of
times registers are accessed, and their lifetime and vul-
nerability, as a part of our future works, new relation-
ships among them will be investigated to permit auto-
matically prioritize the order in which registers should
be protected. This will allow designers to predict the
impact of each register in overheads and reliability when
fault tolerance techniques are applied selectively; there-
fore, this will facilitate the decision making process.
Furthermore, new software-only or hardware/software
soft error mitigation techniques will be proposed by ex-
ploiting the advantages that the selective hardening on
software offers.
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